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Prof Leon Oerlemans and  
Prof Tinus Pretorius collaborated 
on a research project in which 
45 interorganisational projects 
in South Africa were analysed 
to determine whether there are 
different types of temporary 
organisational projects, what 
characteristics they have and  
how they are governed. 
Governing temporary interorganisational projects
by Prof Leon Oerlemans and Prof Tinus Pretorius
There has recently emerged a small, 
but growing body of literature that 
studies temporary collaboration 
between organisations (Jones and  
Lichtenstein, 2008). These are defined 
as goal-directed temporary systems of 
legally autonomous but functionally  
interdependent firms that coordinate  
their efforts for the accomplishment  
of a service or product in a limited  
amount of time (Sydow and Staber,  
2002: 216). Whereas some industries  
have already had a long tradition 
of temporary, project-based 
collaborations, such as film-making, 
theatre and construction, a myriad 
of other industries are increasingly 
adopting this mode of operation, 
including software development, 
advertising, biotechnology, consulting, 
emergency response, fashion, 
television and complex products and 
systems. However, little is known 
about the way these projects are 
managed.
The objective of the study was thus 
to increase the knowledge on the 
management and organisation of 
temporary projects involving the 
participation of multiple partners, 
which could either be organisations 
(such as firms and associations) 
or individuals (such as individual 
professionals) in South Africa.
Data on 50 temporary inter-
organisational projects was collected. 
The survey was developed in the 
context of an international research 
project, entitled ‘Knowledge, 
Governance and Projects’, under the 
leadership of the Centre for Research 
on Business Organisation of Bocconi 
University (Italy). Other project 
members, besides the Graduate 
School of Technology Management 
(GSTM) at the University of Pretoria  
(South Africa), were the Copenhagen 
Business School (Denmark), Louis 
Pasteur University (France), the 
Universities of Cologne and Bonn 
(Germany), the University of Sussex 
(United Kingdom) and Tilburg 
University (the Netherlands).
Types of temporary 
interorganisational projects
To determine whether there are 
different types of interorganisational 
projects, the researchers made 
use of dimensions of temporary 
organisations as proposed by Lundin 
and Söderholm (1995), namely time, 
task and team. As far as time is 
concerned, the aspects taken into 
consideration were project duration 
(in weeks) and whether or not the 
organisations participating in the 
project had collaborated in the past 
(prior ties). The existence of prior 
ties, also labelled as the ‘shadow 
of the past’, is often regarded as an 
indicator of the development of trust 
between partners. Two aspects of 
the task of the interorganisational 
project were taken into account: the 
degree of newness of the products 
developed in the project and the 
financial resources available for 
the project. Regarding the team 
dimension, two aspects served as 
focus: the number of organisations 
participating in the temporary project 
and the number of persons working 
on the project.
All aspects were entered into a latent 
class cluster analysis (Vermunt and 
Magidson, 2002), which resulted 
in a two-cluster solution1. The 
characteristics of the two types of 
temporary interorganisational projects 
are presented in Table 1 on the 
following page.
1 N = 45; lowest AIC = 90; lowest Npar = 18; p-value = 0.128 (> 0.05), all indicating highest model fit. 
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Type I temporary projects last on 
average 1.2 years, and in about 
two thirds of the cases the partners 
also collaborated in the past. In 
a majority of projects, tasks were 
directed at incremental product 
innovation (82.5%), indicating that 
these temporary projects have 
an exploitation orientation aiming 
for refinement, improvement and 
standardisation. Average project 
budget size is relatively small  
(R3.3 million), whereas an average  
of 4.6 organisations form a temporary 
project network.
In many regards, Type II temporary 
interorganisational projects are the 
opposite of Type I projects. They last 
much longer (average of 4.5 years)  
and often have prior ties. A very 
distinct feature of this type is its task: 
generating product innovations with 
a high level of newness (Type II: 
40.4% versus Type I: 17.3%), clearly 
indicating an exploration strategy 
characterised by experimentation, 
novelty and search (Voss et al, 2008). 
Also very distinct is its much larger 
size, indicated by the large budget 
and the relatively high number of 
organisations and persons involved.
Table 1. Types of temporary interorganisational projects and their characteristics
Characteristic Type I (N = 22) Type II (N = 23)
Project duration in weeks (time): Average 64.6 234.7
Prior ties (time): Yes 65.2% 72.7%
Degree of product innovativeness (task): Standard 21.7% 13.6%
Variation on existing product 21.7% 27.3%
New generation of existing product 39.1% 18.2%
New product to partners 13.0% 18.2%
New product for the industry 4.3% 9.1%
New product to the world 0.0% 13.1%
Project budget (task): Average (ZAR) 3 284 700 230 100 000
Number of organisations (team): Average 4.6 13.4
Number of persons involved (team): Average 47.5 538.1
In summary, a typical Type I project 
is a relatively small, short-termed 
interorganisational project with 
incremental product innovation as its 
main task, whereas a typical Type II  
project is a long-lasting, large 
interorganisational project aiming for 
radical innovation.
The governance of 
interorganisational temporary 
projects
The second research question 
concerns the way in which the 
projects are governed. Cacciatori 
and Furlotti, 2006, distinguish 
between two broad categories of 
governance: internal and external. 
‘Internal governance’ refers to those 
aspects of governance that are 
agreed upon (explicitly or implicitly) 
by the project partners, in particular 
by contracts (contractual governance) 
and by administrative instruments 
(extra-contractual governance) that 
are not specified in the contracts. 
‘External governance’, or institutional 
governance, refers to the norms 
and rules (both formal and informal) 
used for a project that stems from its 
environment (for instance, industry 
standards of good workmanship 
or provisions in the civil law that, 
although not explicitly included in the 
formal contract, apply to the project). 
These three types of governance 
were included in the questionnaire.
Concerning contractual governance, 
participants were asked to what 
extent a number of project-related 
issues were specified in written, 
legal and enforceable contracts. 
The results for the two types of 
temporary interorganisational projects 
are presented in Table 22. What 
immediately catches the eye is that 
the level of specification in formal 
contracts in almost all cases is higher 
in Type II projects. 
The only exception is the specification 
of tasks, which is higher for Type I  
projects. A second finding is that in 
Type I projects, the highest level 
of specification is found for tasks 
(77.3%) and for prices, fees and 
royalties (72.7%), whereas for Type II  
projects, prices, fees and royalties, 
duration and property rights over 
assets and output are highly specified 
in contracts.
2 Answer possibilities were: (1) Not specified; (2) General principles specified; (3) Extensive specification of rights and obligations; (4) Complete specifica-
tion of rights and obligations. In Table 2, the scores of the last two possibilities are combined.
I N N O V A T E  4  2 0 1 033E S S A Y S
Table 2. Types of temporary interorganisational projects and contractual governance
Extensive to complete specification of 
rights and obligations
Type I Type II
Property rights over assets and outputs 
(e.g. shares or equity, equipment, brands, patents, products)
50.0% 80.0% (3)
Decision and control rights (e.g. positions in boards, 
direction roles)
50.0% 68.4%
Specification of tasks (e.g. job descriptions, 
technical capitulates)
77.3% (1) 68.4%
Definition of duration (e.g. final delivery dates, 
extensibility clauses)
68.2% (3) 84.2% (2)
Separation procedures 38.1% 63.1%
Warrantees and indemnities 63.6% 79.0%
Prices, fees and royalties 72.7% (2) 94.7% (1)
(#) indicates rank
As to extra-contractual governance, participants were asked to what extent a number of project-related issues were specified 
in written internal charts, procedures and job descriptions in the relation between the key partners. Table 3 presents the 
findings3.
Table 3. Types of temporary interorganisational projects and extra-contractual governance
Extensive to complete specification of 
rights and obligations
Type I Type II
Property rights over assets and outputs
(e.g. shares or equity, equipment, brands, patents, products)
45.5% 52.4%
Decision and control rights (e.g. positions in boards, 
direction roles)
45.4% 68.2% (3)
Specification of tasks (e.g. job descriptions, 
technical capitulates)
77.3% (1) 61.9%
Definition of duration (e.g. final delivery dates, 
extensibility clauses)
77.3% (1) 72.7% (2)
Separation procedures 38.1% 63.7%
Warrantees and indemnities 50.0% (3) 72.7% (2)
Prices, fees and royalties 77.2% (2) 76.2% (1)
(#) indicates rank
3 Answer possibilities were: (1) Not at all; (2) General principles specified; (3) Extensively; (4) Completely.  
In Table 3 and Table 4, the scores of the last two possibilities are combined. 
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Table 4. Types of temporary interorganisational projects and institutional governance
Extensive to complete specification of 
rights and obligations
Type I Type II
Property rights over assets and outputs
(e.g. shares or equity, equipment, brands, patents, products)
31.8% 42.9%
Decision and control rights (e.g. positions in boards,
 direction roles)
18.1% 42.9%
Specification of tasks (e.g. job descriptions, 
technical capitulates)
31.8% 47.6%
Definition of duration (e.g. final delivery dates, 
extensibility clauses)
31.8% 61.9% (1)
Separation procedures 19.0% 38.1%
Warrantees and indemnities 47.6% (2) 47.6%
Prices, fees and royalties 50.0% (1) 52.4% (2)
(#) indicates rank
The findings are highly similar to the 
level of specification in contracts.  
Type II projects are, in comparison to 
Type I projects, characterised by higher 
levels of extra-contractual specification. 
Moreover, in Type II projects, much 
emphasis is on specifying prices, 
fees and royalties, and on detailed 
specification of warrantees and 
indemnities. Detailed non-contractual 
specification of task and duration 
seems to be of importance to Type I 
projects. Comparing the scores on 
the items in Table 2 and Table 3 leads 
to the conclusion that the level of 
specification in contracts is in general 
higher than in extra-contractual 
arrangements.
To investigate institutional 
governance, participants were asked 
to what extent a number of project-
related issues were regulated by the 
norms, habits and practices of the 
industry or by ad hoc specific informal 
agreements among the parties in a 
project, rather than being written into 
a contract or into internal documents.
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Again, the same pattern emerges 
from the data: in Type II projects, 
higher levels of specification are 
used as compared to Type I projects. 
Also similar is the emphasis on the 
specification of duration and prices, 
fees and royalties in Type II projects. 
Finally, it can be observed that 
regulation of projects by rules and 
norms is less frequently used than 
the other two forms of governance 
distinguished in this study.
Conclusions
The analyses of 45 South African 
temporary, interorganisational 
projects revealed that two groups 
of projects could be distinguished: 
relatively small and short-termed 
interorganisational projects aiming for 
incremental product innovation, and 
larger-scale, longer-lasting projects 
on radical product innovations. These 
findings add to the view that there 
is variation in types of temporary 
projects and oppose the often held 
idea that temporary projects are per 
definition short-termed and focused 
on non-routine tasks (see, for 
example, Palisi, 1970).
The use of contractual governance 
is clearly the most intensive form 
of governance, especially in Type II 
projects. Institutional governance is 
less popular among project partners. 
This is an interesting finding, given 
the high proportion of prior ties (70% 
have collaborated with the same 
organisations in the past), which 
are thought to generate trust among 
partners (Jones and Lichtenstein, 
2008). Apparently the balance between 
the wish to prevent misbehaviour and 
trust among project partners shifts to 
the former. Probably, the size of the 
projects, the level of newness of the 
tasks and the context in which they 
operate produce these patterns. 
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